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In a monetary union you can’t afford to have large and increasing structural divergences between 
countries. They tend to become explosive. […] Therefore they are going to threaten the existence 
of the union, the monetary union. 
                                                                                                                  Mario Draghi, 20151 
 
The parallels between Europe in the 1930s and Europe today are stark, striking, and increasingly 
frightening. We see unemployment, youth unemployment especially, soaring to unprecedented 
heights. Financial instability and distress are widespread. There is growing political support for 
extremist parties of the far left and right.                
 
De Long and Eichengreen, 20132 
 
If you think this [the gold standard system] sounds a lot like the eurozone at the moment, you 
would not be wrong. Swap “convertibility into gold” with "the integrity of the euro" and it's the 
same system.  
 
Mark Blyth, 20133 
 
In order for it to be stable, the world economy needs a leading nation, a benign hegemon or 
‘stabilizer.’ I am convinced that this insight can, to a lesser extent, be applied to the European 
(monetary) union. 
                       




Pundits around the world have criticized Germany for either trying to reshape Europe in its 
image or acting in its own self-interest. Germany has been accused of creating a new “empire,” 
of pursuing a new Sonderweg, of “going global alone,” of evasiveness, self-imposed isolation, 
and bullying. The U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have accused 
Germany of pursuing “beggar-my-neighbor” policies with its trade surpluses that threaten the 
Eurozone and even the global economy. Germany protests that it did all it could to save the euro 
and is doing all it can to contribute to European economic health. Indeed, by 2017, the euro had 
survived. But, it survived at the expense of the societies and the economies of the Europe’s 
periphery and to the benefit of its core. As Mario Draghi’s quote above implies, a monetary 
union between a core and periphery cannot endure. We argue here that it can survive only if a 
liberal hegemon in Europe uses its resources to underwrite cooperation in the European Union 
(EU) by transferring resources from the core to stimulate growth in the periphery. That liberal 
hegemon should be Germany. 
     We arrive at this conclusion through a set of three interlocking hypotheses: 1) the 
contradictions between the insecurity of the market and the requirement for political stability 
raise incentives for defection from a fixed exchange rate regime or a monetary union and can 
lead to collapse; 2) treaties and institutions are not adequate to assure cooperation in these 
regimes; 3) the intervention of the most powerful state in the regime is required to provide 
incentives to those who suffer from market instability to remain in the regime. These incentives 
can be channeled through institutions like the EU. We believe that Germany must play the role of 
the liberal hegemon in European Monetary Union (EMU).  It is the only state in the EU that has 
the capability to do so.   
     To illustrate these hypotheses and our argument, we highlight the importance of an historical 
perspective for the understanding of present and future trajectories in the Eurozone and for the 
future of Europe as a whole. We look to the history of the Gold Standard for insight. We are 
certainly not the first to do so. Wolfgang Schäuble, J. Bradford Delong, Barry Eichengreen, 
Mark Blyth, and Matthias Matthijs have led the way.5 Despite dissimilarities in the two historical 
periods (e.g., the gold standard was not a treaty-based monetary union), the fixed exchange rate 
system under the Gold Standard of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and the 
European Monetary Union have much in common. Both are rigid forms of fixed exchange 
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among countries, both are characterized by the free flow of capital between participants, and 
both were thought to be(come) self-stabilizing at their time of inception with the market 
determining the real currency value in the absence of international coordination. But, here they 
diverge: the Gold Standard and its successor, the Gold Exchange Standard, functioned as long as 
great powers provided the means for weaker economies to balance their payments, allowing 
them to peg their currencies to gold without suffering great economic hardship, thus keeping the 
free trade system healthy. When Britain and the United States no longer intervened, however, the 
system collapsed. EMU, on the other hand, was constructed without the provision of support to 
weaker members that would allow them to flourish within the system. It functioned for a few 
years until crisis hit. Although no members have yet defected from EMU, deficit countries like 
Greece continue to suffer. 
     This historical comparison provides a cautionary tale akin to that of Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice.” The tale is an apt metaphor for fixed currency regime like the Gold Standard in the 
absence of British support or the euro as it stands today. The apprentice magician, tired of his 
household chores, tests his nascent skills at sorcery by bringing useful household tools to life and 
making them “self-regulating.” He gives them the power to accomplish their tasks on their own 
without the apprentice having to use them. At first, the plan works well, but eventually the tools 
become unstable. They take on a life of their own and run amok, leaving chaos in their 
wake. Like the tools of the sorcerer’s apprentice, a free trade area bolstered by a fixed exchange 
rate regime or a monetary union is inherently unstable and, left to itself, will wreak havoc on the 
very economies the regime is intended to integrate in order to promote growth in the economies 
of all its members.   
     Under what conditions will a monetary union run amok? We draw on theories of cooperation 
for insight. In a seminal article, Robert Mundell showed that a fixed exchange rate system—and 
by extension, a monetary union must necessarily be a self-regulating system.6 He argued that 
governments can have only two out of three possible options in international macroeconomics: 
1) policy autonomy; 2) free capital flows; and, 3) fixed exchange rates. They could not have all 
three. When participants in the European single market—which required the free movement of 
capital—chose monetary union with a single currency, they necessarily forfeited their policy 
autonomy, submitting themselves to a “self-regulating system.”7 That meant that when they 
experience prolonged hardship, they lose the ability to ease deflationary pressures in their 
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economies—pressures partly imposed by the fixed exchange rate system and capital mobility 
itself. Such a system of cooperation is not stable; those experiencing hardship will defect from it. 
Hegemonic stability theory provides a solution to this problem of cooperation: there must be a 
power strong enough to provide the resources to aid deficit countries so that they will not defect 
from cooperation. Contagion from that defection can cause the system to run amok. Hegemonic 
intervention allows them to avoid painful deflation thereby permitting them to remain in the 
monetary union and bolster their countries’ political stability at the same time.  
     We begin with a brief discussion of the Gold Standard of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and the Gold Exchange Standard of the postwar period of the twentieth century and 
briefly summarize the argument that cooperation under both flourished under hegemonic 
leadership of the most powerful state and collapsed without it. We then flesh out the conceptual 
argument drawn from these historical cases and Charles Kindleberger’s theory of hegemonic 
stability: because of the “sorcerer’s apprentice effect of self-regulating systems,” free trade 
regimes, fixed exchange rate systems, and monetary unions require such leadership to ensure the 
cooperation needed for stability.8 We then illustrate the conceptual argument with a brief 
discussion of European monetary cooperation, and an analysis of the Eurozone crisis after 2010, 
illustrating the “sorcerer’s apprentice effect” in the absence of a hegemonic leader. We argue that 
Germany, although constrained by its embeddedness within the EU and the EMU, has already 
provided disproportionate resources to help bolster cooperation within the institutions of the 
European Union and support the euro. Germany has shown that it has the capability to act as 
Europe’s leader if it is willing. But, by 2017, Germany had refused to provide real hegemonic 
stability to the Eurozone, instead placing the burden of cooperation on weak deficit countries. 
We predict that if Germany continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, the 
European Monetary Union faces collapse.  
 
The Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard, and the Euro 
Like the sorcerer’s apprentice, the architects of the Gold Standard, gave it the power to function 
on its own. Currencies were pegged to a single value (gold), in order to reduce transaction costs 
of trade; no national policy manipulation of currency values was required or desired; deficit 
countries could simply deflate their economies or borrow extensively to pay their bills and 
balance their budgets while leaving the value of the currency intact. But the system would have 
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collapsed much earlier if it had functioned as it was designed. Instead, the stability of the Gold 
Standard of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was backed by Great Britain and the city 
of London to provide liquidity which supported deficit countries. Between 1875 and 1913, 
financial crises were few and far between. When Britain was no longer able to provide resources 
for that support, the Gold Standard—left to market forces alone—collapsed. Financial crises 
spread because without the provision of adequate liquidity, countries in deficit were forced to 
both borrow heavily and deflate their economies to pay for imports. Deflation led to high 
unemployment, giving birth to social unrest and political instability. Excessive borrowing 
triggered banking crises; the threat of such a crisis triggered panic and contagion, deepening 
crisis and fragmenting trade.    
     Similarly, the Gold Exchange Standard of 1945-1971 was a fixed exchange rate system which 
was believed to foster international commerce and cooperation after World War II. This time, 
however, it was not designed to function as a self-regulating system. Its rules and conditions of 
cooperation were embedded in a newly created institution, the International Monetary Fund.9 As 
with the gold standard, all currencies were given fixed rates relative to gold which were 
permitted to change within a 1 percent margin. Although members entered into similar monetary 
bondage to fixed exchange rates as that of the Gold Standard, each government held a stock of 
international reserves--usually gold or dollars (the strongest currency). If market forces changed a 
currency's value more than 1 percent, its government pledged to draw on its reserves to buy its 
currency on the international exchange at a price within the 1 percent band. With the knowledge that 
the absence of liquidity available to deficit countries had destroyed the Gold Standard, the architects 
of the IMF created a countercyclical lending scheme when a deficit country’s reserves were depleted. 
All members promised to deposit a certain amount of gold with the IMF, in order to give it adequate 
funds to lend to deficit countries. The IMF would provide the necessary stability. Yet, as members 
struggled to recover from the ravages of war, IMF resources proved inadequate, and members took 
back their policy autonomy: currency values fluctuated. It was the outflow of U.S. dollars—pegged 
to gold—which dampened these fluctuations and halted the tendency to break free of the fixed-
exchange straitjacket: the dollar provided the liquidity that greased the wheels of commerce. No 
other countries actually fixed their currencies to gold until 1959. Because THE  U.S. did not change 
the dollar value, it was as good as gold and became the world’s major reserve currency. Financial 
crises were few and far between. The IMF and the emerging liberal international trading system 
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required the resources of the United States as dominant power to maintain freedom of trade. But 
when the U.S. government refused to support the dollar’s value with gold, the fixed exchange 
regime collapsed. The global economy again became crisis prone. Similarly, the Eurozone needs 
a leader with the resources to intervene on behalf of deficit countries to help them avoid 
defection from cooperation in the EMU.   
     Although the gold standard was not a monetary union, the euro is a similar tool, fashioned to 
“work on its own,” without the policy autonomy of its member states. All members of the 
Eurozone use the same currency with its value set by international financial markets rather than 
monetary authorities. Members in deficit must deflate their economies or borrow heavily in order 
to pay their bills; they cannot use monetary policy to adjust, and the currency value remains 
untouched by economic circumstances, while the economies of the deficit countries suffer in 
order to protect it at all costs.  
     Building on Mundell’s thesis and the fact that national policy autonomy is absent in the 
Eurozone, we argue that for a single currency to function properly, some kind of hegemonic 
intervention is required to maintain exchange rate stability and free capital flows. In the EMU, the 
“tool” of monetary union worked well in the years following its inception, pushing down interest 
rates, stimulating free trade and growth. But, as a self-regulating tool, it eventually ran out of 
control, and deficit economies suffered increasingly high unemployment as they struggled to rein 
in spending in an effort to balance spending and trade, giving rise to domestic unrest and crisis. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) took measures to protect the monetary “tool,” but not to 
protect the economies and societies of those using it. As we shall see below, the liquidity it 
provided was conditioned upon austerity at the insistence of Germany, its dominant contributor, 
and had perverse consequences for Europe’s weaker periphery. 
 
The Problem of Cooperation in the International System: Trade and Money 
Stable open trade and monetary systems are dependent upon sustained cooperation among their 
members to keep their economies open. But achieving cooperation to increase wealth through 
free trade is difficult because all want its benefits while paying the least possible cost.10 Or, they 
decide that although cooperation benefits the group as a whole, it does not promote their 
individual goals as well as their own unilateral action would. Cooperation is uncertain because 
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each is worried that others will not cooperate. In an anarchic world of sovereign states, members 
of a cooperative regime can leave any time for these reasons.11  
     Cooperation to achieve free trade provides a good example of the conundrum of international 
cooperation. Free trade generates more wealth for all than would be available without trade. 
Based on the theory of comparative advantage, members of a free trade regime specialize in 
producing goods which they can make most efficiently instead of focusing on the production of 
the goods that others can produce more efficiently and cheaply. But production of those goods at 
home disappears, causing unemployment—at least until the time that the economy adjusts, and it 
is unclear how long this will be or if the unemployed will find work in the more competitive 
sectors.  
     As the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. demonstrates, unemployment in noncompetitive 
industries can trigger political discontent. Governments often cannot wait for the shift toward 
competitive industries to materialize and are tempted to leave the international cooperative free 
trade effort in order to protect domestic jobs. In a world of globalization, in which employment 
uncertainty reigns, voters—particularly in uncompetitive sectors—seem to prefer this immediate 
protection to the economic competitiveness and future economic growth that free trade promises.  
Out of this political necessity, governments erect trade barriers which then reduce their trading 
partners’ exports and weaken their economies as well. Historically, trading partners have 
retaliated, setting off a cascade of rising trade barriers and even trade wars. All are worse off 
when each country attempts to protect its (inefficient) industries as a free trade regime 
disintegrates. They become prisoners of their own defection, captured in a noncooperative 
equilibrium. 
     The same tension exists in a fixed exchange rate system or in a monetary union. States that 
trade with each other prefer stable exchange rates and, better yet, a common currency.12 Under 
national currency systems, trade is slowed down because exchange rate stability is not assured. 
One partner in a business transaction will lose money if the currency of her trading partner 
depreciates or is devalued. The more a currency’s value fluctuates, the more likely that this loss 
will occur. This instability makes traders more hesitant to conduct business. Recalling Mundell’s 
thesis, exchange rates will fluctuate when governments seek freedom to manipulate their nation’s 
currency value to meet national political goals. For example, states that experience rising 
unemployment are tempted to pursue policies that devalue their national currency in order to 
8 
stimulate exports and create jobs. This tempts trading partners to do the same. Currency 
devaluations can set off a chain reaction that can destroy trade.  
     A single currency used by all traders significantly lowers the cost and uncertainty of doing 
business for all. There are no national currencies to manipulate. The single currency’s value is 
the same for all trading partners, and markets deepen and grow, making all better off in the long 
run.  In the short run, however, a system of free trade bolstered by monetary union still creates 
winners and losers even as it creates aggregate growth. Members would still be tempted to leave 
the union to protect their own economies if they perceive that protecting the value of the 
common currency endangers political stability.  
     Ultimately the problem of cooperation to achieve free trade and exchange rate stability 
through fixed exchange rates or monetary union is this: there will always be a temporal 
contradiction between the requirements of a liberal trade and exchange rate regime and the 
requirements for national autonomy to pursue policies that shore up political stability. In the 
market, individuals and firms are free to fail, and the inefficient must fail for the sake of growth and 
prosperity for all. The basic anarchy of the market mechanism acting on its own—like the tools of 
the Sorcerer’s Apprentice—produces instabilities in the lives of individuals and whole societies.13 
Governments topple when society is unstable; they therefore act to protect their societies from 
economic threats by withdrawing from a self-regulating free trade or exchange rate regime. 
 
Achieving and Maintaining Stability:  Institutions and Liberal Hegemony 
If institutions are inadequate, how can states cooperate to maintain stable trade and monetary 
systems in which defection is minimized? Multilateral institutions such as the EU and the EMU 
were fashioned to do just that. Members make promises via a treaty (the EU) and, in protocols 
annexed to the treaty and promises to meet the criteria for convergence (EMU). Cooperation 
would be ensured by treaty and coordinated by an institutional structure. Indeed, creating and 
maintaining cooperation within a free trade regime is the EU’s primary raison d'être. Most of its 
budget is devoted to shoring up and administering the free trade regime. From the outset, the 
European Communities built a regulatory structure to reduce transaction costs in a single market; 
members agreed to submit to those regulations to bring about the benefits of free trade. But, 
aware of the contradiction between a free trade system and domestic political stability in member 
states, leaders of European integration also provided incentives for cooperation to keep trade 
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open when members might be tempted to defect and close off their economies. The EU created 
“cohesion” funds to subsidize and thus protect less competitive sectors and stimulate poorer 
regional economies. The composite effect of these expenditures was to create a regime within 
which both equal standards and subsidies to prevent defection would allow for a cooperative free 
trade regime.   
     The question of whether a single market needs a monetary union remains unsettled in the 
literature. Free trade areas and customs unions can survive without a single currency (until now 
NAFTA functions in an area with three currencies), but there is general agreement that a single 
market provides a strong incentive for a monetary union.14 To accomplish this, EMU members 
promised to give up monetary and fiscal policy autonomy, keep their inflation rates low, and 
keep budget deficits and debt within strict limits. The entrenched belief was that if all members 
would “self-regulate,” a self-regulating monetary union would emerge. Extending Mundell’s 
thesis, EMU required participants to give up policy autonomy for the sake of a single currency 
and free capital flows. Unlike with the subsidy provisions the EU provided to bolster 
competitiveness in weak countries, however, there were no provisions to offer weak members 
financial stimulus to make their goods more competitive. If unemployment rose because of 
flagging exports, the weak would be forced to deflate their economies and reduce public 
spending in the hope of distant economic growth. EMU required weaker members of the 
periphery to pursue the same fiscal policies as stronger members of the core and made no 
provisions to provide countercyclical lending. If any member did not stay within the strict limits 
on inflation, debt, and deficits, it would be punished. The ECB would not be a lender of last 
resort. EMU made no provisions for stronger members to take in the weaker countries’ distress 
goods to stimulate their exports. But, as the cases of the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods 
strongly suggest, intervention to aid weaker currencies was required to prevent their defection.  
The EMU, as it was originally conceived, provided for no such mechanisms for intervention on 
behalf of Europe’s weaker countries. At Germany’s insistence, members that face trade and 
budget deficits are forced to take “austerity measures,” e.g., deflate their economies, lay off 
workers, and reduce pensions and incomes in order to rein in inflation and imports. This hurts all 
trading partners. A treaty commitment to remain in the union is simply not enough to prevent 
defection. Austerity measures which put the burden of cooperation on weaker deficit countries 
tempt those countries to leave the union.  
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     Germany and France’s breaches of the EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact in 2003, the rejection 
of an EU Constitution in 2005, the Euro Crisis of 2010, the de facto rejection of a common 
refugee resettlement policy in 2015, and Brexit in 2016 illustrate that these incentives and treaty 
promises are not enough to sustain cooperation. The EU is not a sovereign authority over its 
members. Rebates, subsidies, promises, and punishments are not always adequate instruments 
prevent defection. Defection is costly, but members can leave. While the EU represents a 
multilevel system of governance in which members have ceded aspects of sovereignty to 
Brussels, member governments have ultimate authority over their economies, and they are free to 
take their sovereignty back—most often by simply cheating and ignoring EU Directives.15 It is 
common for cheaters and delinquents to be fined and just as common for them to ignore the 
fines. The EU does not represent the aggregate will of a European people or majority.16 Although 
it is attempting to build a common cultural foundation for its authority,17 as yet it has no shared 
language, no shared traditions and symbols, no shared religion, no shared sense of political 
identity and culture upon which a federal or confederal system of unified governance can be 
built.18 As Robert Schütze, aptly notes, whenever “the sovereignty question is posed, European 
statist tradition returns from the depths of a subconscious past.”19 Even though the literature on 
this topic is vast and debate continues to rage,20 we base our argument here on the assumption 
that the EU is ultimately an “association of compound states.”21 All members indeed contribute, 
but it needs a hegemonic leader to back up its programs to assist less competitive members with 
disproportionate resources. Of course, Germany has made disproportionate contributions but 
they have not always been sufficient, and Germany, like others, has “cheated” on the rules. 
     If treaties and multilateral institutions are inadequate, how does an “association of compound 
states” achieve stable cooperation? Mancur Olson—looking at labor unions—argued that it could 
only be achieved if a cooperative system had a hegemonic leader. Applying his argument to 
international relations, hegemonic stability theory argues that these leaders possess the requisite 
economic size and political power to soften the contradictions that liberal markets and fixed 
exchange rate regimes impose. More generally, a hegemonic leader can alleviate tensions of 
cooperation by providing the bulk of a collective good, i.e., liquidity and/or a large, open 
domestic market, thereby increasing the incentive of those who share in the consumption of that 
good to cooperate. The inductive theory of hegemonic stability please delete this footnote was 
constructed from the observation that when there is a dominant state in an open international 
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economy—Britain in the late nineteenth century and the United States in the middle of the 
twentieth—there was a high degree of cooperation to achieve openness in trade and foreign 
exchange policies.22 In both cases, the absence of hegemonic intervention was devastating: the 
breakdown of the Gold Standard led to trade wars and the breakdown of the Gold Exchange 
Standard precipitated frequent banking crises.23  
     Our definition of a hegemonic leader is the standard one first introduced by Charles 
Kindleberger, and elaborated by Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Barry Eichengreen, and others 
in Kindleberger’s tradition (i.e., Stephen Krasner and Duncan Snidal): a hegemonic leader is the 
state powerful enough to pay the costs required for cooperation and the state most instrumental 
in shaping the roles of cooperative institutions that can prevent defection from cooperation.24 
Kindleberger claimed that in order to remove the temptation to defect from a free trade regime, 
the hegemonic leader must provide five incentives: 1) a stable exchange rate (to provide certainty 
in cross-border trade); 2) a market for distress goods (goods that cannot find a buyer, thereby 
stimulating the potential defector’s economy and creating employment); 3) countercyclical long-
term lending (to balance deficits and possibly create jobs); 4) macroeconomic policy 
coordination (to maintain sustainable government debt and build institutional arrangements that 
allow the correction of emerging imbalances), and; 5)  real lending of last resort during financial 
crises. The hegemon might need to run a trade deficit with the crisis country to stimulate its 
exports; it would need extensive capital for countercyclical and last-resort lending. Finally, it 
would need to provide these incentives in order to gain agreement from other members of the 
union for the creation of stable institutions for policy coordination. In a monetary union, a 
hegemon will underwrite cooperation in the ways outlined above because the stable currency that 
cooperation offers will work to its benefit, promoting exports, creating certainty in good times 
and preventing competitive devaluations in bad ones.   
     Although Kindleberger insisted that a single hegemonic power was necessary for cooperation 
in an open international economy, it is now commonplace to note that the hegemon in a 
cooperative regime does not lead alone. Indeed, leaders have never had such a preponderance of 
power that they could provide the all resources needed for stability.25 Furthermore, they can lead 
within multilateral institutions by providing them with adequate disproportionate resources. In 
fact, it would not be a good idea to provide all of the necessary resources. Kindleberger also 
suggests that shared leadership adds legitimacy and reduces the danger that leadership will be 
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regarded as a cloak for domination.26 Shared leadership reduces the liberal hegemon’s temptation 
of to bully. Certainly, cooperation among liberal democratic states requires leadership within 
institutions in which all members have a say. In a regional discriminatory regime, like the 
European Union, it would be politically impossible for a single state to play the role of the 
hegemon. A state with a disproportionate share of power must necessarily be “embedded” within 
a thick institutional framework that would provide for shared leadership and a cover for 
hegemony. 
     Not altruism, but rather the provision of an adequate disproportionate share of resources to 
underwrite cooperation characterizes hegemonic leadership. Like other members of cooperative 
arrangements, hegemons gain the intangible benefits of stability, while also garnering 
reputational benefits and influence as a result of taking on the largest burden. But, they also gain 
tangible benefits. In a free trade regime, for example, although in theory open markets benefit 
all, they benefit the strongest economy the most; its exports are the most competitive and it 
provides the most lucrative employment market.   
     As an institution, the EU currently lacks the ability to provide these resources to the monetary 
union,27 and the ECB is currently unable to be a “lender of last resort.” National governments in 
the Eurozone issue debt in a currency that they do not control, different government bonds in 
member countries have different risks, returns, and degrees of liquidity, and there is as yet no 
guarantee that there will always be enough cash available to pay out the bondholders. Sovereign 
bond markets in the EMU are therefore susceptible to contagion which can snowball into a 
liquidity crisis.28 More importantly, EMU members are still separate states with their own 
interests and have evidenced little solidarity. They are not willing to create Eurobonds; nor are 
they willing to become a viable transfer union.29 Without a liberal hegemon, EMU will always be 
susceptible to the “Sorcerer’s Apprentice effect.” 
 
German Leadership in Europe? The Case of European Monetary Cooperation 
If, first, the contradictions between the insecurity of the market and the requirement for political 
stability raise the incentives for defection of weak countries from a fixed exchange rate regime or 
a monetary union;  if, second, treaties and institutions are not adequate to assure cooperation in 
those regimes, and; if, third, the intervention of the most powerful state in the regime is required 
to provide incentives to those who suffer from market instability to remain in the regime, then 
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we believe that Germany must play the role of the liberal hegemon in the EMU. It is the only state 
in the EMU that has the capability and the potential will to do so because Germany is the 
preponderant economic power in Europe. We do not wish to argue that its regional power 
resources are commensurate with those of Britain in the nineteenth or the United States in the 
twentieth centuries. Our argument concerns regional—not global—cooperation: Germany is 
Europe’s largest and the world’s fourth largest economy. Its reserves are enormous. Its 
disproportionate resources allow it to play the role that Kindleberger ascribed to an economic 
hegemon in a fixed exchange rate regime. They also allow it to play that role in EMU if it is 
willing to provide the kind of leadership required by Kindleberger’s analysis. Historically, 
however, the force of its ideology of price stability30 and its unwillingness to provide a market 
for “distress goods” because of its own domestic austerity policies has reduced its willingness to 
fully play this role.  
     By dint of its disproportionate economic strength and growing political power since 
unification, Germany’s actual or potential “hegemonic” role in Europe and in monetary 
cooperation has been addressed and debated by a number of scholars.31 We suggest here that 
Germany has the capability but not the willingness to play Kindleberger’s role of a responsible 
hegemonic leader. We could describe Germany’s positive role as one of “soft leadership” in that 
it is deeply embedded in the institutions of the EU, it is shared, and, in many cases, Germany 
leads by example, often making domestic sacrifices to ease the burden of cooperation on others. 
 
German “Soft Leadership” in Europe 
A few examples illustrate Germany’s “soft leadership” in the EU. In contrast to all other member 
states, it is the largest both absolute and net contributor to the EU budget, consistently paying in 
more than twice as much as it receives.32 In order to stem the tide of weapons proliferation 
Germany contributes disproportionately to the EU’s nonproliferation export control efforts, 
imposing more stringent restrictions on its own high technology exporters than other members.33  
Being by far the largest of the environmentally progressive countries in the EU, it is the most 
important of the three leaders in EU environmental policymaking, leading by example by 
imposing at the outset more stringent regulations on its own industry than other EU members 
were required to do.34 When the EU imposed sanctions on Russia in 2014 as a response to the 
Ukraine crisis, Germany once again led its European partners by example, Defying powerful 
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domestic exporters, Merkel put up the highest stakes when she crafted the EU sanctions regime. 
Because Germany’s trade with Russia was the largest in the EU, German business had the most to 
lose if Russia retaliated.35 EU members agreed to cooperate. When the influx of refugees became 
a “crisis” for Europe in 2015-2016, Germany took in the majority of refugees that fled to Europe 
from the Middle East. On this issue, however, Germany failed to persuade all EU members to 
cooperate in refugee resettlement. 
     Domestic politics and ideology have long prevented Germany from fully taking on the mantle 
of a liberal hegemon in the European economy. Its ideology of ordoliberalism is the ideology of 
wage suppression and austerity.36 By virtue of its power position, Germany has forced that 
ideology onto the periphery of the Eurozone and its domestic policies contributed to the crisis in 
the first place. It is to this story that we now turn.  
  
German Leadership (and Lack Thereof) in European Monetary Cooperation 
The history of monetary union in Europe provides a good case study of Germany’s role and the 
role that cooperative institutions (the role of burden sharing and institutional provision of 
incentives for cooperation) played in in creating stable cooperation. It also underlines the 
requirement for Germany to expend more resources to aid cooperation. Our assessment of 
Germany’s role is organized according to Kindleberger’s five criteria for stability discussed 
above. Using these indicators, we examine why the European Monetary System (EMS) was not 
deemed adequate to provide stability and why it was scrapped.37 We then turn to EMU to assess 
the causes of instability and whether future stability can be assured. 
 
The Snake 
The blueprint for European Monetary Union was a 1969 agreement (the “Werner Plan”) that was 
shelved at the outset because of disagreements over how the burden of cooperation should be 
shared—whether surplus (France’s position) or deficit (Germany’s position) countries should 
bear the lion’s share of the burden.38 A stalemate between the two countries led Germany to 
introduce a substitute, called the “snake,” which was intended to provide exchange rate stability 
by lining up European currencies in “bands” allowing for upper and lower limits of currency 
value.  In the postwar years, a recovering Germany was not able to play the role of an 
importer of “distress goods,” but it imported roughly as much as it exported with no 
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significant surplus. It also was both unwilling and unable to meet Kindleberger’s 
additional criteria for leadership. Snake members agreed to joint intervention in exchange rate 
markets to keep member currencies within the band, buying up currencies that were dropping in 
value, and selling those that were appreciating. The burden was to be equally shared among all of 
those who participated in the “snake.”  
     In actuality, they did not have the resources to do so. The snake was launched during the first 
oil crisis, the breakdown of the Gold Exchange Standard, and a period of high global inflation.  
Currency values were falling, liquidity was in short supply, and interventions were few. 
Germany’s Bundesbank alone intervened to stabilize the exchange rates of weaker currencies, 
but those interventions as well were insufficient to prevent defection from cooperation.39 This 
meant that deficit countries would have to deflate their economies—Germany’s preference—
and/or leave the band altogether. Of course, they left rather than deflate. By 1974, the “snake” 
had failed, but Germany’s de facto dominance was unmasked: Denmark, the Benelux countries, 
France, Austria, Norway, and Sweden pegged the value of their currencies to the deutschmark, 
creating a zone of exchange-rate stability. They purchased their own and each other’s’ currencies 
to stabilize them. Nevertheless, the peg to the deutschmark also meant that in order to maintain 
the value of their currency, members would have to adhere to German preferences for the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies through belt tightening if necessary in order to maintain 
price stability.  
     Germany’s ordoliberal ideology of keeping inflation down through belt tightening prevailed, 
because the deutschmark was the strongest currency in Europe and Germany’s economy was 
rapidly becoming the strongest. Kathleen McNamara argues that Germany’s preference was 
clearly influential during this period, but contends that a general preference for price stability 
was part of a neoliberal consensus that was beginning to emerge at that time.40 The evidence 
suggests, however, that Germany forced its ordoliberal preference on others: it was the German 
Bundesbank and the strength of the deutschmark that constrained the preferences of its European 
partners; in negotiations over the creation of the EMS, the Bundesbank even issued threats to 





The European Monetary System (EMS) 
Negotiations to create EMS began when German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt launched a 
multilateral initiative in 1978 to create a new set of common “bands,” and a new set of rules that 
would be embedded in a new EMS institution. Like the rules of the deutschmark zone, the rules of 
the EMS conformed to German ordoliberal preferences: exchange rate stability would be backed 
by increased macroeconomic policy harmonization according to the Bundesbank’s anti-
inflationary standards.42 But, the EMS was also backed by two “safety nets” for those with 
weakening currencies: liquidity and intervention. Though the EMS was supposed to provide those 
safety nets, analogous to the postwar IMF, they proved to be inadequate. Liquidity instead was 
provided by the German Bundesbank. After 1987, the Bundesbank agreed to intervene in defense 
of stable exchange rates to the extent that the defense did not endanger price stability. 
     Over the 1980s, German exports grew to exceed imports and domestic investment began to 
decline. Germany thus became the major net creditor to Europe and a major creditor to the rest of 
the world,43 paving the way for the deutschmark to provide a central source of liquidity for the 
EMS system. Throughout the decade, the Bundesbank bought falling currencies and lowered the 
discount rate to provide countercyclical lending. With Germany providing the resources, 
coordinating decisions on adjustment, providing liquidity, and intervening in crisis, the EMS 
proved to be remarkably successful in stabilizing exchange rates. With its success, German 
monetary hegemony grew and stable exchange rates benefitted German exporters in turn. At the 
same time, however, Germany ran a current account surplus, a de facto blocking of imports from 
less competitive countries.  
     The single market could not ensure continued economic growth, particularly because the 
dollar devaluation after 1985 made European exports to the world relatively more expensive.  
Despite the liquidity that Germany provided, and the currency interventions and discounts that 
did occur, they proved to be inadequate, especially because deficit countries began to import 
more German products and began to borrow from Germany to pay for them. European exports 
slowed, unemployment in deficit countries grew, and economic growth was reduced to a snail’s 
pace. As the situation in the deficit countries worsened, Germany proved unwilling to take in 
their distress goods or provide them with adequate loans. German officials believed that 
increasing liquidity in a recessionary period would put inflationary pressure on the system. The 
dire situation was exacerbated because the currencies of EMS deficit and surplus countries were 
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interlocked; economic fluctuations between them were reflected directly in rising unemployment 
and cuts in the deficit members’ spending rather than in depreciation in value of their currencies. 
Many analysts attributed the worsening situation to the deflationary bias of the German-
dominated EMS. Although participants benefitted from the credibility that the DM “anchor” had 
given their currencies, deflationary pressures and the pressure on exports rendered adherence to 
EMS rules increasingly painful for deficit countries, while Germany continued to accumulate a 
surplus in intraregional trade. As Kindleberger’s argument would predict, without adequate 
liquidity and a willingness to import distress goods, cracks began appearing in EMS cohesion, as 
members were tempted to set their own economic policies to alleviate the budget stresses of 
trade deficits. The EMS as an institution made no provision for deficit countries to tighten their 
belts in order to bring trade into balance. Although Germany took on the task of providing stable 
exchange rates, it was unwilling to undertake the task of stabilizing the system through providing 
deficit countries with adequate liquidity. German leaders began therefore to prefer a tighter 
monetary union that would require deficit countries to deflate their economies if they 
participated in the union.   
 
European Monetary Union (EMU) 
For their part, deficit countries were demanding more “voice” in decisions on monetary 
cooperation in Europe. Certainly, not wanting to engage in deflationary policies, most EMS 
members believed correctly that monetary union would reduce interest rates—achieved by 
collectivizing risk—making it cheaper for them to borrow in order to fund national budgets that 
fell into deficit and prime the employment market lost through the failure of uncompetitive 
businesses. The loss of national monetary policy and debt and inflation limits required by the 
union became secondary concerns compared to these benefits, so agreement among both surplus 
and deficit countries on the benefits set the stage for monetary union.   
     In 1988, France and Italy took the initiative that led to EMU and the creation of a European 
Central Bank. This bank would allow the deficit countries to have a voice in the development of 
EU exchange rate policy. Indeed, Germany quickly came on board in order to shape the new 
system, demanding an independent central bank dedicated to price stability, constraints on 
members’ deficits and inflation, and tight sanctions on “defectors.” In the end, deficit countries 
may have achieved a voice, but it was a weak one, and EMU constrained their behavior. EMU’s 
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core rules were not subject to a vote, and those rules were constructed according to German 
policy preferences. Gone were the “safety nets” of the EMS. Germany required a deliberate 
process of economic convergence among EMU members according to specified “convergence 
criteria.” Indeed, Germany would not agree to a date for the final stage of monetary union until 
others agreed that those criteria must be met before a potential entrant could join the Eurozone.44  
      The “convergence criteria” for EMU membership represented a German effort to achieve a 
common fiscal policy that enshrined price stability, wresting some control over national budgets 
from member governments in order to achieve “burden-sharing” on the part of deficit countries.  
The criteria established common rules to ensure that members who made painful economic 
reforms would not face higher interest rates caused by countries that did not make the same 
reforms. The rules defined 3 percent of GDP as the upper limit for public deficits and 60 percent 
of GDP as the upper limit for public debts. Members also promised to maintain an inflation rate 
not more than 1.5 percent above the rate of the three members with the lowest inflation rates. In 
1996, the convergence criteria were strengthened when Germany insisted on a Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) that created sanctions for defection. Any country breaching criteria for three 
consecutive years was subject to fines that could run to billions of euros. And of course, the 
European Central Bank as the guardian of price stability was not permitted to provide 
countercyclical loans or be a lender of last resort for members breaching the criteria. 
     Without loans and currency interventions, countries and regions feeling recessionary 
pressures had a smaller toolkit for reviving their economies than they had under EMS. National 
control of interest rates had come to an end. Hamstrung by wage and labor inflexibility, 
European governments would normally use fiscal policy to carry much of the load of cushioning 
recessions, but fiscal policy had become severely circumscribed. Despite the arguments of many 
economists that it made no sense to force countries in recession to cut public spending, Eurozone 
members were not allowed to expand budget deficits beyond the 3 percent of GDP required by the 
convergence criteria.   
     Germany’s insistence on these measures was its way of diffusing the burden of adhering to a 
currency union. In doing so, however, Germany relinquished a key function of “soft” hegemonic 
leadership that it had provided under the “snake” and the EMS; neither Germany nor the ECB 
would provide loans or intervene in any other way to reduce recessionary pressures on members’ 
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economies. The strong German economy did provide one important component of 
Kindleberger’s requirement for hegemonic stability: a stable currency. 
     But something was about to shift. Beginning in 1996, Germany fell into a sustained period of 
low growth and mounting fiscal burdens as unemployment skyrocketed, the population aged, and 
healthcare obligations mounted. In order to ease the fiscal burden, the German government could 
have borrowed from within the EU capital market, (to which they were the largest contributor), 
but borrowing would have raised interest rates across the EMU region, further contributing to 
deflationary pressures. Until 2000, Germany had experienced a trade deficit and because of a 
building boom in its new eastern states, it provided a market for its trading partners’ goods. 
Germany attempted to adhere to the SGP, cutting government spending to meet the requirements, 
and shoving the economy into deeper economic crisis. By 2003, it had violated the pact and 
refused to pay the fine for doing so, following Portugal and paving the way for France to break 
the pact as well. Germany flouted the SGP for four years, and in doing so, weakened the very 
regime that it had created. It would now be difficult to ask other Eurozone members with chronic 
deficits to curb their borrowing and spending. 
     Germany’s domestic policies, grounded in its longstanding ordoliberal ideology, helped to 
turn this situation around but also helped to contribute to the impending crisis.45 In 2003, the 
Harz IV reforms begin restrain wage growth and household consumption as a share of GDP, 
which increased the savings rate and the export of credit (surplus savings). While domestic 
investment stagnated, surplus savings were exported as loans to Europe’s periphery, which used 
them to import German goods, leading to lower unemployment in Germany and a growing 
current account surplus. With excess savings, low wages, and stagnant domestic investment, 
German banks expanded their procyclical lending. During the economic boom of 2003-2008, 
Germany extended credit on a massive scale to the Eurozone's Mediterranean countries.46 With 
that credit, they imported German products while Germany bought little from them. Between 
2000 and 2007, Greece's annual trade deficit with Germany grew from 3 billion euros to 5.5 
billion, Italy's doubled, Spain's almost tripled, and Portugal's quadrupled. In Germany, 
consumption of imports dropped, and the savings rate increased.47 But, as the financial crisis 
escalated in 2009, lending abruptly stopped, and Germany had thus failed two tests of a 
hegemonic leader: providing countercyclical lending and providing a market for distress goods.48  
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     As Europe’s main exporter Germany was the chief beneficiary of the lower transaction costs 
that the euro introduced. Because the value of the euro was far below what the value of the 
deutschmark would have been, exported products benefit from competitive advantages. In 2014, 
for example, the IMF estimated that Germany’s inflation-adjusted exchange rate was undervalued 
by 5-15 percent.49 So, rather than providing a market for their trading partners’ goods, Germany 
began to accumulate a huge trade surplus with the rest of the EU. Indeed, German exports 
increased four-fold from 2002 to 2010. In 2012, its share of the wealth created by the euro was 
almost half the EU total.50 This contributed to German dominance and its insistence of policies 
based on its ordoliberal ideology. It did nothing, however, to spur Germany into taking on the 
role of a liberal hegemon. 
 
The European Financial Crisis:  The Need for Hegemonic Leadership 
Kindleberger’s argument was that cooperation for exchange rate stability—and by extension, 
monetary union—will disintegrate without hegemonic leadership in the form of a market for 
distress goods and adequate aid to deficit countries. While Germany’s large financial reserves 
and lending ability gave it considerable political clout in the Eurozone, Germany had no 
intention of providing a market for the distress goods of the periphery. Private banks were the 
lenders, and the EMU initially had no provisions to aid deficit countries. Between 2003 and 2009, 
it appeared that the Sorcerer’s Apprentice had created a mechanism for stability that would work 
on its own, and aid was not needed. As expected, the pooling of risk in the Eurozone kept 
interest rates low, and along with Germany’s liberal financing, allowed the countries of the 
periphery to expand trade deficits to buy German exports.  
     But, low interest rates were a temporary privilege, given the growing imbalances between the 
Eurozone core and periphery. In 2009, five members of the Eurozone periphery– Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain—had failed to generate enough economic growth to pay back 
their debts. Investors were exposed and the threat of bank failures loomed. When the 2008 U.S. 
financial crisis hit Europe, a lender of last resort was nowhere to be found.  
     European leaders held a series of panicky meetings in spring 2010 to find such a lender.  
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had apparently read his Kindleberger, and 
declared that the hegemonic stability thesis was more relevant than ever in Europe’s current 
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situation. He suggested that Germany and France should revive their old alliance and together 
become the liberal hegemon of Europe—the hegemon that was missing in the 1930s.51  
     Yet, for the next three years, this was not to be. Briefly it appeared that Germany would back 
the ECB with funding as a lender of last resort, but its loans were inadequate to alleviate the 
crisis. Members pooled their resources to raise euro 500 billion in conditional loans, and for the 
first time, the ECB intervened in markets to buy debt. But, it was not enough, and the loans had 
the perverse effect of reducing bank exposure, and increasing the exposure of Greece’s sovereign 
debt.52 Because it provided the largest contribution (30 percent to France’s 20 percent and Italy’s 
17 percent), German voters threatened a backlash. Chancellor Merkel insisted on a euro 250 
billion IMF load to ensure that Europeans would not bail out Greece alone. 
     Soaring interest rates and slowing growth in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and France 
triggered more concerted action within the Eurozone to create a lender of last resort. In late 2012, 
EMU members created the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a treaty-based organization 
capitalized at euro 700 billion with a lending capacity of euro 500 billion. Because Germany’s 
funds were indispensable in providing the bulk of ESM’s capital, it retained veto power over its 
decisions. Fearing the potential moral hazard that would come with such lending,53 Germany 
required borrowers to implement belt-tightening measures and join the “Fiscal Compact,” a 
stricter replacement of the SGP. Financial markets deemed that none of these measures were 
sufficient, and so the crisis was only reigned in once the ECB president pledged to do “whatever it 
takes” to save the euro. (He did not pledge to save the economies of countries in distress.) 
Ultimately, this meant agreeing to purchase bonds and accepting them as underlying support for 
commercial banks from countries in distress that promised to meet Germany’s conditions. 
     Germany’s dominance and the dominance of its long-held ordoliberal convictions meant that 
austerity in the periphery became the condition for the core to provide bailout funds intended to 
save the euro. For the deficit countries, however, this meant deflation. So, without fulfilling the 
other criteria for leadership, namely stimulus from creditor countries to spur growth in weaker 
economies, Germany’s insistence on austerity meant that the odds of weaker countries’ defection 
from cooperation would increase. 
     Since 2011, the ECB has extended its authority to purchase sovereign debt, and to become a 
lender of last resort through the ESM, and to provide liquidity through its quantitative easing 
program beginning in 2015. The European Financial Stability Facility now joins the ESM as a 
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bail-out mechanism, and the ECB has begun to provide long-term loans to prevent private banks 
from collapse. By 2017, the ECB had added U.S. $2.3 trillion to its balance sheet.54 The Fiscal 
Compact provided ECB oversight of individual country budgets and strengthened budget rules. 
With Germany’s hesitant approval, the ECB created a “banking union” with plans for a common 
fund to aid failing banks and the transfer of bank supervision to the ECB. But it did not create a 
transfer union, i.e. a mechanism for transferring resources from rich to poor countries in crisis. 
Surplus countries were not required to make adjustments to reach macroeconomic equilibrium.  
     These new and expanded institutions still cannot respond adequately to economic downturns 
resulting from deflationary pressures. President Emmanuel Macron of France has argued that the 
monetary union needs to expand its budget to do so. That budget expansion, however, largely 
depends on Germany’s willingness to provide the bulk of the required resources. But, Germany 
seems unwilling to bend—in fact, saving the currency union as a self-regulating edifice appears 
to be more important than helping struggling European economies in the periphery to create the 
economic conditions necessary for cooperation within that union. 
     Greece provides a potent example of how Germany and the EMU protected the currency at the 
expense of the periphery’s economy and the welfare of its society in the absence of hegemonic 
intervention.  Greece received three “bailouts” during the crisis, calming threats of defection 
(“Grexit”) from the Eurozone. While Greece clung to the euro, unemployment increased to 28 
percent and between 2008 and 2013, the Greek economy contracted by a quarter of its pre-crisis 
level. Despite optimistic reports from the government to the contrary, the Greek economy 
remained stagnant through 2016;55 the debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 128 percent in 2010 to over 
175 percent in mid 201756 with no debt relief in sight. In the first half of 2017, Greek household 
consumption continued to decline, and Eurostat reported in 2016 that 22 percent of Greece's 
population was “severely materially deprived.” Forty percent of Greek children live below the 
poverty line.57  
     But, because the euro remains intact, optimism has shaped the official narrative of Eurozone 
recovery in 2017. According to the EMU framework, Greek debt is considered sustainable as long 
as the total cost of servicing it does not exceed 15 percent of annual GDP. Nonetheless, for Greek 
society, the burden of remaining in the Eurozone is dangerously high. The same is true for other 
European periphery countries; borrowing costs have fallen and growth has recovered, but 
unemployment and debt burdens remain high, and the banking system remains fragile.58 The 
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stability of the currency continues to be preferred over the health of members’ society and 
economy. 
 
Conclusion: What Needs to be Done 
Growing economic power has permitted various German governments to shape the terms of 
cooperation in the European Union. The cautionary tale told here suggests that cooperation 
among sovereign states in a monetary union can spiral out of control, like the broom in Goethe’s 
“Sorcerer’s Apprentice.” By putting harsh burdens on the backs of weak countries that could not 
carry them, the 1919-1939 interwar period cruelly and painfully taught the world many lessons 
about how not to solve problems in periods of crisis. At least three of these lessons are important 
for our discussion of the role of hegemonic power in stabilizing the Eurozone. First, in order for 
all members of a free trade and fixed exchange rate regime to be prosperous, adjustment to 
macroeconomic disequilibrium needs to be undertaken by both “surplus” and “deficit” 
economies—not by “deficit” economies alone. Second, in order for crises to be successfully 
managed, the lender of last resort must truly be a lender of last resort: it must create whatever 
asset the market thinks is the safest in troubled economies, and must be able to do so in whatever 
quantity the market demands. Finally, in order for any monetary union or fixed exchange rate 
system to survive, it must be willing to undertake large-scale fiscal transfers to compensate for 
the absence of exchange rate movements. All three of these measures require liberal hegemonic 
leadership.   
     These measures rub against Germany’s entrenched ordoliberal ideology, but Germany may 
play a more constructive hegemonic role in the future. In recent years, both German GDP and 
productivity growth has slowed, and the IMF predicts that by 2020 it will fall below the Eurozone 
average.59 Germany’s aging population means a shrinking labor pool, which suggests that in the 
absence of new immigrant labor, the economy will remain sluggish. It may also suggest that 
Germany will reduce its surpluses; it has already introduced a minimum wage, and its aging 
population should soon begin to draw down their savings. Surpluses have already fallen from a 
peak of 8.6 percent of economic output in 2015 and are expected to fall to 7.6 per cent of GDP in 
2018.60 This is good news for the weak economies of the Eurozone, but Germany will need to 
take further steps to lower its savings rate and increase its imports in order to help stimulate the 
economies of the periphery. 
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     Germany’s slow growth further suggests that German dominance over Eurozone rules may 
wane; a strong Germany is needed to enforce austerity as a condition for economic stimulus in 
the periphery; low interest rates in Europe mean less dependence on Germany, and Germany’s 
slow growth can lead to a less “Germanic” policy ideology and continued ECB stimulus in the 
Eurozone as a whole.61  
     Germany still remains Europe’s economic powerhouse with the potential to provide 
hegemonic leadership. The saga of Germany’s role in European Monetary Union, however, is 
still unfolding. Ordoliberalism is an entrenched ideology, but economic conditions may push 
Germany to play the more constructive role of a liberal hegemon. We have argued here that 
leadership means not only shaping the terms of cooperation, but also using resources to stabilize 
the weakest members of the regime. Will Germany hear our cautionary tale, heed the lessons of 
history, and become the kind of leader that the EMU requires? 
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